Modelling pilot decision-making errors in New Zealand general aviation : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Social Sciences at Massey University by Pitham, Claire
Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for 
a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and 
private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without 
the pennission of the Author. 
Modelling Pilot Decision-Making Errors 
in New Zealand General Aviation 
A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AT MASSEY UNIVERSITY 
Claire Pitham 
1992 
ii 
Contents 
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Chapter One: The Argument for Studying Air Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Chapter Two: Reviewing the Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Section One: Specific Models of Air Accidents .............. 21 
Section Two: The Driver in Road Transport Accidents . . . . . . . . . 31 
Section Three: Human Error in Industrial Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
Method .................................................... 77 
Results .................................................... 87 
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Biographic Information and Error Occurrence .................. 97 
Ambiguities in the Surry Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
The revised Surry Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
Countering Behaviours Associated with Accident Involvement. . . . . . 126 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 
Appendix 1 : Data List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
iii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Trends in The Causality of Accidents: Extent to Which 
Accidents are Attributed to Mechanical or Human Causes. . . . . . . 6 
Figure 2: Example of The Haddon Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Figure 3: The Latent Failure Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Figure 4: Characteristics of Factors Associated with Risk Acceptance. . . 43 
Figure 5: Domino Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Figure 6: The Surry Decision Sequence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
Figure 7: General Explanation of the Accident Phenomenon. . . . . . . . . . 52 
Figure 8: The Management Oversight Risk Tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Figure 9: SRK Model of the Cognitive Levels of Behaviour Control. . . . . 59 
Figure 10: Errors in Cognitive Control of Behaviour: The Psychological 
Mechanisms of Human Malfunction ....................... 60 
Figure 11: Taxonomy of Human Error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Figure 12: The Diagnostic Task in System Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Figure 13: Model of Human-System Interaction ................... 66 
Figure 14: Accident Loss Causation Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
Figure 15: The Anatomy of an Accident. ........................ 72 
Figure 16: The Human-Machine Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 
Figure 17: The Presence and Presentation of Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
Figure 18: The Accident Sequence as a Single Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
Figure 19: System boundaries and Operator Response Options. . . . . . 115 
Figure 20: Behavioural Changes as Indications of Avoidance 
Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
Figure 21: Representation of Safety Orientation in Behaviour . . . . . . . . 118 
Figure 22: Completed Revision of the Surry Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 
iv 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Pilot Age (Years), the Number of Cases and Percentage of Sample 
Attributed to Each Error Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Table 2: Number of Accidents in Sample Involving Air Transport (ATPL), 
Commercial (CPL), Private (PPL), or Student (SPL) Pilots . . . . . . 89 
Table 3: Number of Cases and Error Type for Private (PVTE) and 
Commercially (COM) Licensed Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Table 4: Licence Held (Student, Private, Commercial and Air Transport) 
and Total Flying Experience (Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
Table 5: Private Pilot Flying Experience (Above or Below 500 Hours) 
and Error Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
Table 6: Flying Time Gained on 'Type' Aircraft (Low/High), the Number 
of Cases, and Percentage of Sample Attributed to Each Error 
Type (Total Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Table 7: Presence of Passengers, Number of Cases, and Percentage of 
Sub-Sample Assigned to Each Error Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
Table 8: Frequencies and Percentage of Sample Assigned to Each Error 
Type ............................................ 95 
Table 9: Rater Judgements of Error Type in Reliability Check. . . . . . . . . 96 
Table 1 O: Conditions Attributed to Accident Causation, Their Causes and 
Suggested Remedies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my thanks to my supervisor, Dr Ross St. George, 
who has constantly provided me with help and support during the writing of 
this thesis. 
To my parents David and Diana go my love and thanks for their support of 
the 'eternal stoodent', and the packets of toffee pops that died soon after 
making the hazardous trip south. 
The Transport Accident Investigation Commission has been most helpful in 
granting me access to their investigation files. Without their co-operation, 
this research would not have been possible, and I would like to thank the 
staff there for the opportunity to use their time and resources. 
Many other individuals and organizations have freely helped me with the 
research involved with this thesis, and I would like to take this opportunity to 
acknowledge their generous assistance. I would especially like to thank 
Peter Ham and Penny Mackay for their help and expertise. 
V 
This thesis is dedicated with love and thanks 
to my life-partner Anna. 
vi 
Abstract 
Accident statistics indicate that the rate of mortality and financial loss 
associated with general aviation accidents is comparable with that of 
passenger transport operations. However, general aviation appears under-
represented in literature pertaining to the development of safety 
interventions. 
In this thesis, this apparent disparity is addressed in an investigation of pilot 
error in New Zealand general aviation. Using the precedent of accident 
modelling developed in industrial safety research, accident models taken 
from aviation, road transport and industrial settings are reviewed for their 
representation of human error. The Surry Model (1969), a twelve point 
sequence representing operator decision making processes, was selected 
for generalization to aviation. 
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The selection of this model was congruous with research literature identifying 
poor decision making as a primary causal factor in air accidents. Each of 
the points in the model represents an opportunity for accident avoidance if 
certain information processing requirements are met. 
The model presents accident avoidance as the result of three processes: the 
correct recognition of stimuli, the correct cognitive processing of avoidance 
options, and the correct implementation of physiological responses. The 
accident sequence within which these processes occur is divided into two 
cycles: the build-up of danger in the system, and its subsequent release. 
The model was applied to a data base of 84 cases involving fixed wing 
aircraft engaged in general aviation, selected from 1980 to 1991. The point 
at which an error in pilot decision making occurred was identified and coded 
using the twelve points of the Surry Model. These data were combined with 
information concerning biographic characteristics of the pilots, and the 
number of passengers on board the flight. All pilots in the sample were 
male. 
2 
Two research questions were investigated. The first questions whether the 
Surry Model is a useful tool in the analysis of information about accident 
sequences. The model was used as a template, and laid over the time line 
of accidents, as they had been determined by air accident investigators. 
The second research questions sought to determine whether the format of 
the model could be used as a protocol for developing time lines and 
questioning pilots during accident investigations. 
A small final sample size resulted in a general dichotomizing of the variables 
for non-parametric Chi Square statistical analysis. The power and utility of 
the analysis was limited and could only show that, beyond chance effects, 
there were no biographic characteristics of pilots that influenced the cycle of 
the model in which the accident inducing error occurred. 
No quantitative examination of the twelve error types identified by the model 
was possible. A low level of inter-rater reliability showed that the model 
was not as self-contained as anticipated. Raters appeared to use the model 
in a consistent manner, but modes of use varied between individuals. It is 
suggested that this may be a function of non-standardised presentation of 
human factors information in air accident reports, coupled with non-
standardised interpretations of ambiguities in the model. 
On the basis of the inferential interpretation of the data, two main areas of 
discussion arise. The first is concerned with 'ambiguities': the structural 
characteristics of the Surry Model that influenced the fall of data onto the 
twelve error types. It became apparent that the typical sequence of events 
in aircrashes differed from the temporal sequence depicted by the model, 
and that assumptions made in the model about the configuration of the pilot-
aircraft interface were inaccurate. Accordingly, modifications to the model 
are proposed. 
The second area of discussion is centred on 'antidotes': corrections for pilot 
errors identified as causal in aircrashes. The results indicate that some 
aspects of in-flight behaviour could be targeted for intervention. It is 
suggested that it may be useful to encourage pilots to engage in active 
information search from external sources in order to ensure that they 
supplement information available from the aviation system. Self-monitoring 
before flight may induce voluntary self removal from aviation activities. It is 
possible that some pilots may abstain from flight if they become aware that 
their performance has become impaired as a result of their physical or 
emotional condition. 
3 
It is also suggested that risk communication techniques could facilitate the 
development of worst case thinking by pilots who are confronted by potential 
hazards. Rather than a more traditional emphasis on the implementation of 
strategies after contact with danger, these antidotes may encourage the 
active avoidance of danger. 
4 
Introduction 
Chapter One: The Argument for Studying Air Accidents 
"There is no cause for New Zealand to be complacent about safety levels in 
civil aviation. This applies to all sectors of the aviation industry" 
(Swedavia-McGregor Report 1988, p. ii). 
Aviation safety is an international concern. The development of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1944 demonstrates a long 
standing, world-wide commitment to the reduction of air accidents. Despite 
improvements in safety on a passenger/mile travelled basis, more lives are 
threatened and lost in air accidents every year, as the capacity and 
complexity of airliners increases. A similar effect is occurring in general 
aviation, as flight has become more available as a purely recreational 
pastime. This chapter presents evidence that the number of lives lost and 
the overall number of accidents associated with general aviation is high 
enough to warrant a focus on safety equivalent to that in commercial 
aviation. 
This chapter also discusses the disparity in the amount of public and media 
attention that is devoted to general and passenger transport accidents, and 
suggests that these differences result from different perceptions and 
expectations about safety in each situation. Evidence is presented that 
suggests that changes in safety orientation occur when individuals take sole 
control of transport systems, and that this effect also occurs strongly in 
general aviation. 
A focus on pilots as targets for intervention is supported by a review of the 
extensive literature about air accidents, in which the high rates of 'pilot error', 
and growing dissatisfaction with that concept is described. Research that 
identifies pilot decision making errors as a primary factor in air crashes is 
reviewed. 
This chapter also discusses the role of sequentiality in accident occurrence, 
and introduces the industrial safety principle of modelling accident 
sequences in order to interrupt the interaction of causal factors. 
The Problem of General Aviation Accidents 
Data are available that show that general aviation activities are associated 
with high rates of loss. In New Zealand, the Air Transport Report 
(1989) shows that there were 158 fatal or serious injuries sustained by 
individuals engaged in general aviation activities between 1980 and 1989. 
International data also show the number of accidents that occur in general 
aviation. In the United States for example, Salvatore, Stearns, Huntly & 
Mengert (1986) report 45627 general aviation accidents between 1973 and 
1983. Of these accidents 7165 were fatal. The Insurance and 
Reinsurance Group (1990) reports that in 1988 in the United States, there 
were 438 fatal accidents, resulting in 782 deaths. O'Hare & Roscoe (1990) 
also show that the rate of fatal aviation accidents reported to the NTSB 
during 1983 was almost 50% higher than that of commercial passenger 
transport operations. 
The 1989 Annual report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Boards reports 501 
civil aircraft involved in reported accidents, with 64 fatalities resulting from 3, 
accidents. Research on British air accidents between 1969 and 1981 
shows a similar dominance of pilot factors as causal factors in accidents 
involving light aircraft (Underwood Ground 1984). 
These accident rates have a high cost, both in terms of the lives lost and 
the property damage that results. In New Zealand, the Swedavia McGrego 
Report used the National Roads Board estimate of the value of the human 
life to calculate that in the ten year period from 1980 to 1989, fatal general 
aviation accidents alone had an incurred cost of $35 million (NZ). 
These costs, however, do not appear to be the result of mechanical failures 
during flight. Research into commercial plane crashes has revealed that 
the relative proportion of machine failures in accidents has decreased 
systematically with improvements in aircraft technology. This change is 
shown in Figure 1 . 
Relative 
Proportion of 
Accidents Caused 
Human Causes 
Machine Causes 
Time 
Figure 1: Trends in The Causality of Accidents: Extent to Which Accidents 
are Attributed to Mechanical or Human Causes. [Source: Nagel, D.C (1988), 
Human Error in Aviation Operations, p. 266, Fig 9.4] 
However, a tradition exists of blaming pilots for accidents, regardless of 
contributing causal factors. An example of this precedent is presented by 
Wolfe (1979), who describes the reactions of naval test pilots when several 
of their number are killed in flying accidents. 
After a string of accidents, the pilots gather to discuss the events. In one 
case: 
"They shook their heads and said it was a damned shame, but he 
should have known better than to wait so long before lowering the 
flaps."(1979, p. 13). 
In another: 
" ... they mentioned that the departed had been a good man but was 
inexperienced, and when the malfunction in the controls put him in 
that bad corner, he didn't know how to get out of it."(1979, p. 13). 
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After more accidents: 
" ... [they] were incredulous. How could anybody fail to check his hose 
connections? And how could anyone be in such poor condition as to 
pass out that quickly from hypoxia?''(1979, p. 14). 
11 
••• [they] remarked that the departed was a swell guy and a brilliant 
student of flying; a little too much of a student, in fact; he hadn't 
bothered to look out the window at the real world soon enough. 11 
(1979, p. 15). 
Although attributions of pilot error have been traditional points for the 
termination of accident investigations, research has shown that though 
blaming pilots for crash occurrence is inappropriate, pilot factors are major 
agents in accident sequences and need to be investigated more thoroughly 
than has previously been the case. 
Characteristics of Accidents - Pilot Error 
Research conducted by Boeing as early as 1953 (cited in Nagel 1988) 
showed that cockpit crew errors were causal in 66.9% of reported accidents 
in air carrier operations. Hartman (1979) suggests that the level of human 
error involvement in air accidents is 70%, while Jensen (1982) reports that 
85% of accidents occurring in the United States between 1970 and 197 4 
resulted from pilot error. In general aviation activities, Nagel (1988) 
suggests that pilot behaviours cause 9 out of every 1 O accidents. 
The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation of Australia (1988) cites human error 
in 85% of accidents. Errors that resulted from the actions of pilots 
accounted for 76% of all error. 
7 
In 1989, the New Zealand Office of Air Accident Investigation came to the 
conclusion that the most common feature of aircrashes was "human error on 
the part of the pilot (which may in turn be the result of inadequate training in 
a proportion of the cases)" (Air Transport 1989, p. 4). Chappelow (1989) 
presents data from the Royal Air Force that shows a pilot error rate in 
accidents of 40%. 
8 
Copas (1989) suggests that pilot error is more often a case of poor 
judgement rather than poor aircraft handling. He adds that "The general 
aviation accident rate is unlikely to decline significantly until those types of 
problems can be reduced" (p. 6). O'Hare (1990) reports National 
Transportation Safety Board records which identify human error in 50% of all 
fatal general aviation accidents over a five year period. 
As can be seen from these reports, the involvement of human error in 
aircrashes is high, despite the lack of agreement about its specific role. It 
should also be noted that the 'popularity' of human error as an explanation 
for aircrashes is matched by an opinion among air accident researchers that 
this attribution of causality is in itself relatively meaningless. 
Feggetter (1982) argues that despite a wide recognition of the importance of 
pilot error in accident occurrence, the concept has not been developed as 
far as it might have: 
"A satisfactory technique for the investigation of human error type 
accidents and incidents has not yet been standardized. "(p. 1065). 
Nance (1986) observes that: 
"Discovering that a human error - pilot error or otherwise - has 
occurred is merely a starting point. To have any hope of preventing 
such an error from causing an accident again and again, ... the 
underlying cause of that human failure must be revealed and 
addressed in future operations."(p. 229). 
Hawkins (1986) also observes that: 
"The pilot error concept ... focuses on what has happened, rather than 
why it happened and so for this reason ... has been unhelpful in 
accident prevention activity.'1(p. 27). 
Gerbert & Kemmler (1986) describe findings attributing accidents to human 
error as: 
• ... rather crude and even inadmissible over-simplifications of very 
complex processes."(p. 1449). 
Zeller (1972) comments that: 
'' ... pilot error has little, if any, meaning unless it is in some way related 
to the circumstances under which the error occurred, and specifies in 
some detail the error committed. Remedial action is dependent on this 
kind of detailed information."(p. 496). 
Cath (1974) also notes that any investigation of an air accident should 
include a philosophy that a human error accident can have causes that vary 
from:-
" ... intentional suicide through various levels of unintended self 
destruction, through overwhelming summation of circumstances 
(over-load), to pure accidents of indifferent fate - i.e. the unavoidable 
mid-air.''(p. 1300). 
Similarly, Hill & Pile (1982) suggest that a finding of pilot error is one of 
'exclusion'. They suggest that this judgement is reached when no other 
factor might have been found to account of the occurrence of the accident. 
This observation is supported by O'Hare (1986), who adds: 
'' When accidents have occurred, and no obvious mechanical defect 
could be found, there has been a tendency to regard the cause of the 
accident as 'pilot error'. Whilst no-one would ever have regarded 
'engine-error' or 'wing-error' as acceptable causes for an accident, ... 
the label has found general acceptability". (p. 18). 
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These comments indicate that there is growing dissatisfaction with the 
concept of human/pilot error, especially with the power of these terms to 
explain why accidents occur. The studies that criticize the use of the term 
generally suggest that a diagnosis of 'human error' is only a blanket term for 
a variety of mistakes made by pilots. 
Researchers have thus sought to identify more specific components of the 
pilot error construct. For example, Ricketson, Johnson, Branham, & Dean 
(1973, cited in Sanders & Hoffman 1975) present a more detailed analysis of 
aviation human error when they suggest that faulty decision making and 
unnecessary risk taking are frequently occurring elements in pilot error 
accidents. 
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In a different study of American military data, Ricketson, Johnson, Branham 
& Dean (1973, cited in Ricketson, Brown & Graham 1980) found that nine 
factors developed from a factor analysis of military helicopter accidents 
accounted for 96% of the cases in a data base of 1520. 
When this study was extended in 1975 (Dean & Neese, cited in Ricketson et 
al 1980), the same factors were implicated in 97% of helicopter crashes from 
1969 to 1975 - some 5171 accidents. The nine factors identified in the 
initial study, and later supported in a larger data base, were disorientation, 
over-confidence, errors in procedural decisions, failures in crew co-
ordination, errors in precise multiple control, limited experience, task 
oversaturation, attention errors, and weather conditions. The greatest 
loadings were placed on the failures in crew co-ordination (10%), attention 
errors (13%), procedural decisions (18%), and precise multiple control (20%) 
factors. 
In an examination of British air accident statistics, Shuckburgh (1975) also 
found that an element of air crew error commonly associated with air 
crashes was decision making. More specifically, the error was the incorrect 
operation of the aircraft from Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC). In analysis, this factor accounted for 30% 
of accidents attributed to flight crew error, while 'judgement' accounted for 
17% of accidents. 
Similarly, Jensen (1977) reports that 51.6% of fatal accidents, and 35.1 % of 
non-fatal general aviation accidents in the U.S were attributed to bad 
decision making behaviour. O'Hare (1990) describes a common cause of 
fatal accidents in the U.S. as "faulty decision-making activities" (p. 599). 
11 
Roscoe (1980) and Jensen (1982) identified three characteristics of pilot 
error. In this model, pilot error occurs in procedural, perceptual-motor, or 
decisional activities. Procedural activities are linked to the management of 
the plane's power plant, fuel, vehicle configuration, navigation, and 
communication. Errors found in the perceptual-motor activities involved 
vehicle control, judgement of distance, speed, altitude, and geographical 
orientation. 
Decision activities were also a primary source of error, and involved pilots' 
assessments of their skill and of the aircraft's capabilities. Navigation, 
planning and flight priority adjustment were also included in this factor. 
Jensen & Benel (1977, cited in Jensen 1982) used this three tiered 
behavioural classification in an investigation of United States air accidents 
from 1970 to 197 4. They found that 51.6% of fatal accidents resulted 
from faults in the decision making activities of pilots. 
In 1986, Gerbert & Kemmler used factor analysis to isolate four dimensions 
of pilot error. These were errors in vigilance, information processing, 
perception, and sensorimotor activities. Vigilance errors included the failure 
to check and maintain altitude, delays in taking necessary actions, poor 
scanning of instrumentation, and the failure to check and maintain airspeed. 
Information processing errors were described as erroneous judgements, 
miscalculations, wrong decisions and faulty action plans. The behavioural 
manifestation of these errors tended to be penetration of IMC under VFR, 
the misjudgment of weather conditions, continuing a VFR flight under IMC, 
and navigational error. 
Perception error types included the misjudgment of altitude and clearance, 
misjudgment of safe distance, the misjudgment of safe airspeed, spatial 
disorientation, the misjudgment of safe altitude and the failure to see 
obstacles. Sensorimotor and handling errors were associated with the failure 
12 
to apply or the faulty application of procedures, the failure to implement 
necessary non-procedural actions, exceeding design stress limits of aircraft, 
and poor coordination of controls. 
There can only be a cautious acceptance of these data as a representation 
of pilot error. Although the factor loadings are high, the correlational nature 
of factor analysis techniques makes causal attributions impossible. 
However, there do appear to be links between the two models of pilot errors. 
Jensen (1982) defines two forms of behaviour in pilot judgement. The first 
is the perceptual-motor tasks that occur during the course of a flight, while 
the second relates to the decisions that pilots face when they select between 
alternatives presented to them in the changing environment. 
. Jensen suggests that these two facets of pilot judgement can be placed on 
a continuum of cognitive complexity and decision time. Perceptual-motor 
tasks are highly learned response that can be performed rapidly, and have 
relatively little cognitive complexity. Decision making in contrast, involves a 
greater degree of complexity and time, if only because set procedures may 
have been forgotten by the operator. 
He defines pilot judgement as the ability to search for, and establish the 
relevance of all available information regarding a situation, to specify 
alternative courses of action, and to determine expected outcomes from 
each alternative. 
It also entails the motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a suitable 
course of action within the time frame permitted by the situation, where (a) 
'suitable' is an alternative consistent with societal norms; (b) 'action' includes 
no action, some action, or action to seek more information (1982, p. 64). 
It can be seen in the many studies of the characteristics of pilot error that 
there is little or no agreement on definitions of even common terms. The 
concept of pilot judgement has been used and accepted with no strict 
operational definition. This makes the use of the data generated by the 
studies reviewed difficult. Many researchers discuss the relationship 
between pilot error and pilot judgment, but it is difficult to compare and 
contrast their ideas. 
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Despite differences between these studies, an overall theme is present 
throughout the research into aviation accidents. Issues of pilot error and 
judgement revolve around human performance in decision making and 
information processing. Historically, accident investigation techniques have 
reflected the lack of differentiation between the many forms of pilot error that 
have been identified - accident reports have been characterised by a paucity 
of human factors information. 
It would appear that not only is there a need for an intervention to lower the 
incidence rate of these kinds of errors, but that there is a need for the 
development of a means of systematic collection and analysis of information 
about errors during accident investigation. That is, a tool is needed which 
can be taken to the crash site by investigators, and used to generate 
information about the pilot's cognitive processes. 
Interventions: Enforcement Engineering, and Education 
Despite growing dissent about the use and meaning of the term 'human 
error', there appear to be three forms of intervention widely accepted in 
safety research. These are the use of enforcement of regulations that aim 
to prevent the occurrence of accidents, engineered methods to reduce the 
damage that results from an accident, and educational programs to reduce 
the willingness of individuals to engage in activities that expose them to the 
risk of accidents. Although 'enforcement', 'engineering', and 'education' are 
traditional ways of reducing the frequency and consequences of accidents, it 
is suggested that they are not necessarily equally applicable to all 
14 
circumstances in the aviation environment. This is especially so when it is 
considered that poor pilot judgement has been identified as a primary source 
of error in air crashes. 
Enforcement interventions can take two forms. One is the placement of 
new restrictions on activities that are believed to contribute to accidents, 
while the other is more strict responses to transgressions of existing 
regulations. Because these options are relatively easy and inexpensive to 
implement, they are popular in the process of attempted accident reduction. 
This has been demonstrated by the changes in public opinion towards the 
legal treatment of individuals charged with drinking and driving offenses. 
It might appear that this intervention is appropriate for general aviation 
because the New Zealand Civil Aviation Regulations (1953), and the new 
Civil Aviation Rules are the primary controls on pilots. However, there is no 
formal mechanism by which transgressions can be detected and punished at 
the time they occur (there are no 'air police' for example). Legislated safety 
devices are thus removed from their targets, and can only have limited 
impact on the aviation community. 
This observation is tempered by the recent court actions taken against 
individuals in New Zealand who have been involved in accidents that have 
resulted from regulation infringements. While these actions may prompt 
some individuals to increase the degree to which they monitor their 
behaviour, it is also possible that some individuals hold attitudes that make 
them resistant to this kind of legal intervention. It is therefore difficult to 
determine the extent to which 'judicial' changes will influence safety 
orientation in the total aviation population. 
It is suggested that legislation has limited preventative utility. Further, it is 
also questionable whether legislation would stop the occurrence of errors of 
judgement, as it would appear that poor judgement inherently implies a 
disregard of rules, be they safety regulations or legal requirements. 
1: 
Engineering interventions are designed to reduce damage resulting from a 
accidents and therefore have limited preventative usefulness. In most 
cases, they are effective only after the accident sequence has been initiated 
and can only limit the extent to which damage can occur. Some risk 
theorists (for example Adams 1985) have argued that engineered safety 
devices might actively encourage system operators to engage in dangerous 
activities. This occurs because those individuals recognise the increased 
safety afforded by the devices, and increase the amount of danger to which 
they expose themselves by a similar amount. 
This is not to imply that there are no technological advances which might be 
instrumental in the prevention of accidents. Evidence shows that 
mechanical failure is not often involved in accident occurrence. Engineered 
changes may only isolate a relatively minor aspect of accident causation. 
Education appears to be a desirable technique as it can be directed at a 
specific target group. As discussed by Kirkwood (1988) for the road 
transport environment, it could be useful to target novice pilots for an 
intervention as any strategies learned may affect safety behaviours from the 
beginning of their careers. 
This may provide an immediate decrease in levels of accident involvement, 
and possible improvements in the skills and standard of the 'next 
generation' of pilots. As trained pilots become senior members of the 
aviation community, their examples may assist in the development of safe 
flight in other young pilots who may learn from their actions and expressed 
attitudes. This type of vicarious learning is especially important when it is 
considered that every pilot holding a New Zealand licence will hold, or have 
held a Private Pilot licence. 
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An intervention that instils safe habits in trainee private pilots may therefore 
increase the safety skills of the highest level of pilot in civilian flight 
operations - the Air Transport pilot. Initial pilot training seems the most 
useful point at which to develop a safety education program because of the 
potential long term influence on the aviation community. 
Support for the use of education to achieve this can be found in the 
Swedavia-McGregor report: 
Private pilot accidents seem to be largely related to skill, experience 
and attitudes. Attitudes are difficult to change, and because the 
private pilot may not fly many hours per year, skill and experience 
may develop slowly. Improvement in private aviation safety is 
therefore rather slow at present. (1988, p. 13). 
Specific and direct safety education of the novice pilot may provide a 
counterbalance for inadequacies in knowledge and experience. It is also 
possible that training directed at this level of flight operation will influence 
overall pilot attitudes in situations removed from the initial period of 
education. In order to develop a program that can achieve this, it is 
necessary to collect maximal information about the causes of accidents, 
particularly with regard to the poorly defined areas of pilot error and 
judgement. 
Designing Interventions: Data Collection and Accident Modelling 
The analysis of accidents has traditionally been important in industrial safety 
research (Mencke! & Carter, 1985). The information collected has been 
used to break accidents down into component causes, in order to interrupt 
the 'accident sequence'. Since Heinrich (1931, cited in Heinrich, & Grannis 
1959) proposed the Domino Model of Accident Causation, it has been 
accepted that altering or disrupting the sequence of events leading to an 
accident can reduce the frequency or effect of its consequences. 
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This is a technique that is widely accepted and used. Leplat & Rasmussen 
(1984, 1987) suggest that analyses based on "causal models of the accident 
chain of events" (1987, p. 157) can identify design deficiencies and 
weaknesses in systems. 
Tuominen & Saari (1982) describe systematic investigations of accidents as 
techniques for developing effective accident prevention techniques. 
Purswell & Rumar (1984) agree that models of accident processes can 
facilitate interventions with international and standardized accident data 
collection systems. 
Suokas (1988) suggests that the utility of accident research lies in the 
identification of factors affecting the occurrence of accidents, and the 
subsequent focus of data collection onto relevant factors. These models 
provide guidelines about where to develop safety intervention programmes. 
It thus appears that the best way to approach designing safety interventions 
is to accurately model accident sequences, identify causal agents, and 
design them out of the system. 
Research has already identified errors in pilot decision making and 
judgement as primary causal factors in air crashes. A model of accident 
occurrence which would be useful in the development of an aviation 
intervention would focus on these aspects of pilot behaviour. 
Two principles have been developed in the tradition of modelling accident 
sequences. These principles have been adopted to such an extent by 
researchers that it can be argued that any complete model of accident 
causation must include them. 
The first principle is that of sequentiality, proposed by Heinrich in 1931 (cited 
in Heinrich & Granniss 1959) in his axioms of industrial safety. 
This principle is that 
... the occurrence of an injury invariably results from a completed 
sequence of factors - the last of these being the accident itself (p. 86). 
18 
This principle has been widely adopted. Votey (1986), for example, 
describes accidents as random occurrences which have been caused by 
"potentially identifiable factors that may be traceable to the acts of victims or 
others" (p. 86), or to the environment in which the individual was working. 
Laflamme describes "the presumed existence of typical sequences of events 
leading to accidents - previously initiated by a deviation in a man-machine 
system" (1990, p. 155) when discussing sequences in accidents. Johnson 
(1980) adds that these sequences provide many opportunities for 
intervention, and thus:-
lt seems essential ... that accident investigation methods and 
summaries give appropriate visibility to the complex realities [of 
events], rather than the simplistic categorization of conditions and acts 
so often found. (p. 75). 
The second established characteristic of accidents can best be called 
multifactorality. It is generally agreed that the factors precipitating accidents 
are many and varied (Singleton 1973, Andersson 1990) and may be 
removed from the accident event (Thygerson 1977). 
Hart & Honore (1959) for example, suggest that:-
··· it seems easy ... to be mislead by the natural metaphor of a single 
causal 'chain', which may lead us to think that the causal process 
consists of a chain of single events, each of which is dependent upon 
(would not have occurred without) its predecessor in the 'chain', and 
so is dependent on the initiating action or event. (p. 67). 
There may be conditions in the system which contribute to accident 
occurrence without being recognisable as part of the accident sequence. 
These have been referred to as 'latent risks' (Reason 1991 and Green 
1988), which are activated by human errors outside accident sequence. 
The extent to which the principles of sequentiality and multifactorality have 
been adopted in safety research indicates they are necessary for the 
development of comprehensive models of accident sequences. In this 
thesis, these axioms have been used as criteria for the selection of an 
appropriate model for the specific analysis of pilot error in aviation 
accidents. 
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Other characteristics of good models have also been described. Kjellen & 
Larsson (1981) suggest that models useful in the design of interventions 
should be suitable for practical investigation work, have concepts and 
definitions that are easy to understand, and be related to concepts and 
terms in general use. They should also be suitable for use with different 
types of systems and accidents, and identify all causal factors in the 
accident sequence. 
Benner (1984) evaluated fourteen different types of models and also 
identified several aspects of superior models. He suggests that a good 
model should be a realistic accident representation, with a direct definition of 
the problem. It should include a comprehensive scoping of accidents, a 
framework for disciplining investigators' tasks, be accessible to laypeople, 
and be consistent with safety concepts. It would also be non-causal to 
avoid problems of 'blaming'. 
The concern of Kjellen & Larsson (1981) and Benner (1984) with the 
accessibility of information contained in models is especially important for the 
investigation of pilot cognitive errors. Air crash investigators may not have 
specialized training in the identification and representation of cognitive 
behaviours, and any useful model must be able to present information in a 
form that is directly useable. 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter indicates that there is a strong need 
for a safety intervention in aviation that focuses on the prevention of pilot 
decision making and judgement errors. Modelling accident sequences in 
crashes that result from these behaviours appears to be the most effective 
ways of identifying the components of these errors, so that the accident 
sequence can be interrupted. On the basis of accepted principles of 
accident modelling, various criteria have been established. 
A model seeking to represent the characteristics of pilot error in New 
Zealand general aviation must provide a sequential representation of 
pilot decision making and judgement behaviours, in a manner that 
allows non-specialists to use and understand the information 
generated by it. 
Chapter Two: Reviewing the Models 
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This chapter reviews models of accident occurrence developed for 
transportation and industrial systems. It is divided into three sections. The 
first examines specific studies of air crashes, and is concerned with the 
investigation of the characteristics and causes of pilots error. 
The second section examines models of accident occurrence developed in 
the rod transport environment, because there are distinct parallels between 
the control tasks of the operator in a driver-automobile interface and in a 
pilot-aircraft system. This section focuses on the extensive road transport 
literature about driver characteristics and accident involvement. The 
concept of accident proneness which has been well researched in the road 
transport arena, is related to the 'Right Stuff' myth of pilot bravado (Wolfe 
1979), and Votey's research into Failing Aviator Syndrome (1986). 
Research into human risk taking behaviours is also reviewed. 
The third section of the chapter reviews models of human error in industrial 
accidents. These models range from the early work of Heinrich (1931, cited 
in Heinrich & Granniss 1959), who attributed accident involvement to 
